(4) There exists no unresolved (nor unconsidered) undermining evidence, that would effectively lead S to doubt or disbelieve p, violating condition 2. In other words,
(4a) In situations of critical doubt, S must have adequate evidence (i.e., strong reasons, e1, e2, e3, etc.) for believing p, and S must be able to resolve (i.e., rule-out, discard) any actual or logical possibilities that would undermine (or defeat) the evidence possessed for p, and
(4b) There cannot actually exist undermining evidence q (no matter whether S is
aware of it or not) that would significantly weaken S’s belief
that p. If there does exist evidence q that strongly suggests not p, and if S was to be
aware of this evidence, then S must have (or acquire) evidence to dismiss (or resolve)
counter-evidence q.
The first conjunct 4a is a normative internalist condition that requires S to have strong evidential
premises for believing p. The first sentence of conjunct 4b is an externalist
condition that provides a context to S and surrounding environment.
The second sentence of conjunct b is a subjunctive conditional about what S's belief would be if contrary-to-belief evidence
q were to be introduced as additional evidence or as counter-evidence. Condition 4b speculates about what would be
the case, if new evidence were to come into consideration. The truth value of a subjunctive conditional is
understood to be determined by the specific content of its components, and is to some degree speculative.
The truth of such a conditional is judged by imagining circumstances that are close to the ways things actually stand,
and how things would go in alternative circumstances.
Conditions 4a and 4b do not specify any principle of what counts as undermining evidence that would (or should)
lead S to doubt p, but leaves this as a matter of conscientious deliberation for truth-seeking subjects in particular
real world situations.
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