Home Page: What is Knowledge?

Back Cover (1 page)

Introduction (4 pages)

Chapter 1- What is Meaning and Reference? (34 pages)

ABSTRACT: Should the concept of 'meaning' be of primary interest when formulating a philosophy of language? Is a sentence's 'meaningfulness' primarily about its being true or false? An examination of the principles of semantic reference and compositionality is offered. A theory of 'speaker meaning' is proposed. A theory of 'speaker reference' is contrasted to formal theories of 'semantic reference.' The pithy slogan that is adopted here is that 'speakers refer, but linguistic entities don't refer.'

Chapter 2- A Challenge to Formal Semantics: What is a Proposition? (29 pages)

ABSTRACT: In Part I of this chapter, I will summarize some of the assumptions and intuitions that underlie formal semantics. It is intended to be informative to readers who are unfamiliar with formal semantics. In Part II, I ask 'what is a 'proposition?' The simplified definition of 'proposition' as proposed here, stands in some opposition to the definitions held by metaphysicians and philosophers of language. I will assume that 'proposition' is subject to conceptual analysis as a stipulative technical definition, as opposed to a metaphysical analysis.

Chapter 3- Is There Metaphysical Reality & Necessity? (39 pages)

ABSTRACT: Three key assumptions underlying the disciplines of Metaphysics, Epistemology, and Semantics are examined as practiced in contemporary analytic philosophy. First, it is questioned whether there is a 'metaphysical reality' in any intelligible, non-fictional sense. Second it is skeptically questioned whether the a priori- a posteriori distinction has legitimate value in explaining the epistemology of certain classes of assertion. A third concern is with the concept of 'necessity.' I argue that there are four philosophically interesting senses of 'necessity': causal, deductive, conceptual, and metaphysical. These senses are surveyed with a focus on 'metaphysical necessity.' I skeptically question whether metaphysical necessity is an insightful sense with fruitful applications. Saul Kripke's (1980) explanation of the epistemology of proper names and natural kind terms is critiqued.

Chapter 4- A Conceptualist Account of Mathematics: An Alternative to Realism and Nominalism (27 pages)

ABSTRACT: Philosophers understand the discipline of mathematics to be concerned with the development and systematic investigation of formal 'abstract structures' (or ‘objects’). A major concern for philosophers is how can mathematicians have epistemic access to these abstract structures? Is mathematics about a real and objective order of abstract mind-independent entities or are mathematical objects (or ‘concepts’) mind-dependent? In previous chapters a mind-dependent response, including a theory of definition and concepts was advocated. In this chapter, the debate between mathematical 'realists' and mathematical 'nominalists' is examined. It is argued that both of these positions are false, and that another position, historically named 'conceptualism' is the best explanation of how we can have mathematical knowledge. Conceptualism is consistent with physicalism, giving it an important advantage in comparison to realism and nominalism. Conceptualism resolves pertinent epistemological and ontological issues in logic with greater clarity and plausibility than the alternatives. Before discussing the status of mathematical objects, we will need to summarize some of the historical issues in metaphysics, as well as introduce the realist, nominalist, and conceptualist positions.

Chapter 5- On Why Mathematics is Neither Analytic Nor A Priori (23 pages)

ABSTRACT: This chapter critiques the concepts of 'analytic proposition' and 'a priori knowledge.' It will be shown that the concept of 'analyticity' can plausibly be redefined to allow its classic core examples to remain as instances of analytic assertions (e.g., 'all bachelors are unmarried'), but with the redefinition, the concept of analyticity has limited extensions and no theoretical importance. With respect to the concept of a priori truth, it has been indicated in previous chapters that this is a very dubious concept. In this chapter, it is suggested that mathematics may be knowable a priori, but this knowledge is only about truths-in-a-language, and that with alternative explanations from the descriptive-prescriptive distinction, the epistemic concept of the a priori can be abandoned.

Chapter 6- A Brief History of Analytic Philosophy (27 pages)

ABSTRACT: Contemporary analytic philosophy has been greatly influenced by major developments in mathematics and logic that occurred in the nineteenth century. A short history of these events and subsequent theories is the topic of this chapter.

Chapter 7- Epistemology Since 1983 (75 pages)

ABSTRACT: A sketch of the recent history of epistemology is presented. Two modern approaches to epistemology have distinguished themselves: epistemic contextualism and virtue epistemology. David Lewis, Stewart Cohen, and Keith DeRose are advocates of a contextualist semantics for knowledge claims. Ernest Sosa, John Greco, and Linda Zagzebski are all leading advocates of a virtue epistemology approach towards understanding knowledge. Two related principles, ‘sensitivity’ and ‘safety,’ have also been proposed and contrasted as a necessary condition for knowledge. These approaches followed from preceding 'reliabilist,' 'relevant alternatives,' and 'truth-tracking' theories. In this chapter, these approaches are critically assessed. Attention is centered on individual philosophers and their worldview beliefs, linguistic beliefs, use of definitions, use of analogies, and general methodology.

Chapter 8- A Critique of Prichard's Anti-Luck Epistemology (29 pages)

ABSTRACT: Duncan Prichard is a prolific author. Some of his thinking has evolved over the decades. His preferred species of virtue epistemology is an 'anti-luck' (or ‘anti-risk’) epistemology. In this chapter we initially examine "Anti-Luck Epistemology" (2007) and Knowledge (2009). We will then review Prichard's “The Gettier Problem and Epistemic Luck” (2019) where many of the earlier writings are reiterated and summarized. Prichard has more recently used the term epistemic risk rather than epistemic luck, and argues for an anti-risk epistemology in “Varieties of Epistemic Risk” (2022).

Chapter 9- Williamson’s ‘Model-Building' Conception of Philosophy (32 pages)

ABSTRACT: Timothy Williamson has published many books and articles in diverse fields. Williamson’s The Philosophy of Philosophy (2007) has been the subject of much attention. In Philosophical Method: A Very Short Introduction (2020), Williamson presents an elementary introduction into his vision of proper methodology for philosophy. In this chapter, we follow Williamson’s narrative and critically analyze his claims. Williamson’s ‘mathematical model building methodology’ is in sharp contrast to the ‘social science conceptual analysis methodology’ advocated here.

Chapter 10- Contemporary Problems with Analytic Philosophy (18 pages)

ABSTRACT: There are several reasons why contemporary ‘analytic philosophy’ isn’t relevant to humanity as a whole. Four factors are discussed: (1) philosophers ignore the influence of ‘worldview intuitions,’ (2) an absence of a social scientific methodology, and (3) an absence of a theory of definition. This has led to (4) a proliferation of artificial distinctions and stipulative definitions. This chapter discusses ‘philosophical progress.’

References (19 pages)

Appendix (1 page)

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