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This website supports two monographs:
In the two volumes of Descriptions, Prescriptions, and the Limits of Knowledge (2027) it is argued that descriptions may be knowable, but prescriptions are not knowable. The theoretical definitions of "description" and "prescription" have ties to epistemology, metaethics, the philosophy of language, the philosophy of mathematics, aesthetics, formal semantics, metaphysics, and philosophical methodology. Comments welcome at NSPL at aol.com.
A 'description' is an assertion that purports to express a correspondence (or a representation) of some state of affairs, where its correctness (or incorrectness) is independent of its acceptance (or non-acceptance) by particular persons.
--Descriptions: (1) empirical statements, (2) true-in-a-language sentences (e.g., theorems, valid entailments, analytic sentences, and tautologies), (3) reportive (lexical) definitions, (4) theoretic (natural kind) definitions, (5) aesthetic assertions, and (6) social science theories. --Prescriptions: (1) stipulative definitions, (2) 'sufficient evidence' assertions (especially in regress situations), (3) the axioms, vocabulary, syntax, and inference rules of formal deductive systems, and (4) normative ethical assertions.
Table of Contents: Descriptions, Prescriptions, and the Limits of Knowledge (2027) Volume 1
Table of Contents: Descriptions, Prescriptions, and the Limits of Knowledge (2027) Volume 2
Eight Essays in Conceptual Analysis (2027) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Recent Essays:
The Irrelevance of Contemporary Philosophy (Submitted to Theoria). (20 pages). ABSTRACT: Robert Frodeman and Adam Briggle in an essay “When Philosophy Lost Its Way” (2016), Susan Haack in Putting Philosophy to Work (2013), Myisha Cherry’s “Coming Out of the Shade” (2017), and Philip Kitcher’s What’s the Use of Philosophy? (2023) rightly claim that the discipline of philosophy has become unproductive, despite many published journal essays and books. Their work is summarized. In addition, the sociology of professional philosophy is examined and suggestions on how to fix analytic philosophy are offered. The central issue is that the mainstream of philosophy fails to engage with ordinary people and has no value to society as a whole.A Contextualist Theory of Personally Justified Belief (Submitted to Philosophical Studies). (25 pages). ABSTRACT: The question of whether (and when) a person has 'adequate' or 'strong enough' evidence (or reasons) to believe and ultimately know an empirical proposition is a long-standing problem for epistemology. Most times, the problem is framed as an appropriate relationship between ‘propositions’ (or beliefs). In this essay, I specify the problem of the relationship as between ‘evidential propositions’ (or beliefs) as accepted by subject S. With this relationship, we can ask how much evidence (e.g., quantity and quality) must S possess before S can claim to know p is true? What stops a regress in the demand for reasons to support a belief and the beliefs that support it? Another question is discussed: when is evidence 'sufficient' to rule out the existence of defeating facts (and to eliminate doubt, and retain a strong belief that p is true)? I advocate a contextualist theory of justified belief similar to the ideas proposed by David Annis (1978), Robert Hambourger (1987), Michael Williams (2001), and Adam Leite (2005). A contextualist theory of personal justification answers the regress problem better than belief justification of foundationalism and coherence theories. The problem of radical skepticism, featuring the brain-in-the-vat argument, is addressed. This essay outlines a relationship between ‘regress of reasons’ skepticism and ‘radical’ (BIV) skepticism. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Other essays:
Atheism, Religion, Democracy, and the Free Market Economy
(50 pages). ABSTRACT:This essay supports atheism (as a worldview) that is worth consideration as opposed to theism (as a worldview). An atheist doesn’t believe in the existence of God while theists believe that God exists. This chapter suggests why an atheist citizen of a democracy (where equal rights are granted) should be respected and considered on social issues where the separation of church and state is at issue. In a democracy, both ‘freedom of religion’ and ‘freedom from religion” should be respected. The atheist's liberties should not be curtailed as a result of laws favoring a particular religion. For example, an atheist does not believe that souls are conferred by God at human conception in the womb, and as such, religious beliefs of this kind should not influence medical decisions about the appropriateness of an abortion. Religion, democracy, and the political-religious movement of Christian nationalism are discussed. Robert Audi’s (2024) pro-choice abortion argument is outlined. Allie Beth Stuckey’s (2024) Christian anti-abortion argument is presented. The free market system of economic organization is discussed. The institution of a federal guaranteed basic income (BI) for low-income persons (employed or not) using a negative income tax (NIT) is advocated for the United States.
What is a Prescription? What is a Proposition?
(23 pages). ABSTRACT: The word 'prescription' is used in natural language and analytic philosophy but no precise definition for this term has been established. Here I advance a theoretical definition of a descriptive-prescriptive assertion distinction. In order to understand how descriptions and prescriptions function, a summary sketch of their ordinary use is presented. There are four important kinds of 'prescriptions': (1) regress-ending 'sufficient evidence' claims, (2) stipulative definitions, (3) the axioms, vocabulary, syntax, and inference rules of deductive systems, and (4) normative ethical assertions. Six kinds of 'descriptions' are explained: (1) empirical assertions, (2) deductive entailments, (3) reportive (lexical) definitions, (4) theoretic (natural kind) definitions, (5) aesthetic assertions, and (6) social science theories. A definition of 'proposition' is formulated using intuitions from twenty case examples. Soames (2010) claim that "for a sentence to be meaningful is for it to represent the world as being a certain way" (p. 1) is shown false.
In Defense of the Method of Cases
(16 pages). ABSTRACT: In this essay I argue that intuitions and ‘the method of cases’ are crucial to informative conceptual analyses in analytic philosophy. I argue that ‘case studies,’ in the form of thought experiments, play a decisive role in evaluating a philosophical theory. In contrast, experimental philosophers have objected to the method of cases, on grounds that the verdicts of various case studies when presented to laypersons, lead to diverse verdicts. These verdicts are sometimes based upon irrelevant factors such as cultural background, order of case presentation, affective content, and heritable personality traits. In “Experimental Philosophy and the Method of Cases” (2021) Horvath and Koch present the current status of the experimental challenge. These authors conclude that arguments and empirical evidence supporting the ‘method of cases’ and the ‘expertise defense’ are unconvincing. They state that the burden of proof still lies upon philosophers supporting the method of cases. I respond to this challenge with the use of intuitions, conceptual analysis, and definitions, to defend the method of cases with an ‘expertise defense’ as the proper methodology for a social scientific analytic philosophy.
Contemporary Problems with Analytic Philosophy
(7 pages). ABSTRACT: There are several reasons why contemporary ‘analytic philosophy’ isn’t relevant to the general public and humanity as a whole. Three factors are discussed: (1) philosophers ignore the influence of ‘worldview intuitions,’ (2) there is an absence of methodology, and (3) there is an absence of a theory of definition. These factors intersect to some extent. This critique assumes a reader’s familiarity with Descriptions, Prescriptions and the Limits of Knowledge (DPLK) and Essays in Conceptual Analysis (ECA). This critique is an overall evaluation.
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| What Is Knowledge? Chapter One is devoted to the philosophical problem of finding a definition for the term ‘knowledge.’ | |||||
Until the appearance of a short journal article written by Professor Edmund Gettier in 1963 it was taken for granted among philosophers that 'knowledge' is definable as ‘justified true belief.’ In other words, for a person S (subject) to know p (a proposition, assertion) the person needs to believe p, p has to be true, and S needs to be justified (i.e., have strong reasons) for believing p. This 'traditional definition of knowledge' can be stated as: 'Knowledge' = 'justified true belief.' With counter-examples presented by Gettier (1963) and Gilbert Harman (1973) it was shown that this traditional definition cannot be correct. Below, I present two illustrations of the kinds of counter-examples provided by Gettier and Harman. These examples show that 'knowledge' cannot be simply defined as 'justified true belief.' My goal is to suggest an alternative definition of knowledge that responds to the counter-examples below and provides a consistent world-view about the possibility of knowledge. |
Counter-example #1: Professor Brown Returns to a Classroom– | |||||
The following example illustrates a Gettier counter-example.
The story: Professor S is a philosophy professor at a major university.
He works in the department with his close friend and colleague, Professor Brown.
S believes that Professor B will be reading and lecturing on his
recently completed journal essay
at a meeting of ten graduate students and a visiting professor at 4PM on Friday afternoon in
Room 222. This is a major presentation and Professor Brown is excited about the scheduled paper
reading. There are numerous posters in the hallway advertising the event, and all ten graduate
students have mentioned to Professor S their enthusiasm to attend. At 10AM on
the same Friday morning S sees B, and B is prepared
and eager to present his paper. S knows that B is dedicated, reliable,
enthusiastic, and punctual. Because of prior commitments, Professor S cannot
attend B’s reading, but S strongly believes (upon strong evidence)
that ‘B will be in Room 222 at 4PM on Friday.’ However at 11AM, the anticipated meeting begins to fall apart. Several graduate students have extenuating circumstances and cannot attend the presentation. The visiting professor also phones B and because of a plane delay at the airport, cannot attend. These parties communicate this to B by phone or e-mail by 1PM on Friday. At this time, B begins to feel ill with a sore throat, and at 1:15PM he decides to cancel the presentation and phones the remaining graduate students with the promise to reschedule the paper reading in the future. Professor B lives near campus, and it is a 15 minute walk to campus. At 3:45PM on that Friday, B remembers that he left his reading glasses and a book in Room 222 on campus. He walks to campus, and happens to be in Room 222 at 4PM. At this same time, Professor S thinks about his colleague, Brown, and says to himself, I know that ‘B is now in Room 222.’ The question: As a matter of fact, it is true that B is in Room 222, S believes that B is in Room 222, and S has strong evidence and is justified in believing that B is in Room 222. (All three conditions of the traditional definition of knowledge are satisfied). But, in this situation, does S really ‘know’ that B is in Room 222 at 4PM? The reply: Professor S does not know that ‘B is Room 222 at 4PM.’ Having knowledge is typically thought to be stronger than just having a lucky, coincidental true belief. To know p it is usually thought that a person should have the right reasons (or a true account) for why one believes p. S’s true belief that B is in room 222 is a matter of luck (or coincidence). The problem: This is a clear counter-example to the traditional definition of knowledge. In this case, S possesses a belief p and has a strong justification (i.e., strong evidence, strong reasons) for believing p, and p is true, but S does not know p. Knowledge cannot be defined as ‘justified true belief’ since this is a case where S has a justified true belief that p, but S doesn’t know p. |
Counter-example #2: The Henry and the Barn Case– | |||||
The following example proposed by Carl Ginet and popularized by Alvin Goldman (1976) best illustrates a Harman problem. The story: Let us imagine Henry and his young son are traveling in a car in a rural setting. There are all kinds of normal things that Henry sees; trees, cows, barns, birds, and so on. Henry points out all of these things to his young son, in order to help him with his vocabulary. But unknown to Henry, he has migrated into a rural area where many cleverly constructed barn facades have been built to accommodate a nearby Hollywood film crew. These ‘barn facades’ are not really barns, but are carefully constructed plywood props. Let us suppose that in this situation that there are (in fact) 99 barn facades in the area, and only one real barn that is sturdy and functional for normal use. Let us further suppose that Henry is now traveling in front of the one real barn and states ‘There is a barn.’ The question: Does Henry know that he is seeing a barn? In this case, Henry has a true belief because Henry is actually seeing a barn, and Henry has strong evidence and justification (i.e. Henry is in a rural setting, Henry is viewing what looks like a barn, Henry’s perceptual faculties are working normally, etc.). In sum, Henry believes that he is seeing a barn, it is true that Henry is seeing a barn, and the existence of a real barn is why Henry believes he is seeing a barn. (All three conditions of the traditional definition of knowledge are satisfied). But, in this situation, does Henry really ‘know’ that ‘I am seeing a barn?’
The reply: As almost everyone would agree, the mere fact that Henry has a genuine true belief based upon truth-connecting and pertinent evidence (e.g. being in a rural setting, viewing an apparent barn, etc.) is not sufficient for Henry to know that ‘I am now seeing a barn.’ The reason why we deny Henry’s having knowledge in this situation, is because of the existence of undermining evidence that Henry is unaware of in this material situation. If Henry was aware that the other 99 objects are barn facades, Henry would acknowledge that he could not distinguish a real barn from a barn facade, and Henry would concede that his belief that he was now seeing a barn had weakened considerably, so that he would not know whether he was seeing a barn. In this example (with the existence of 99 nearby barn facades) Henry does not know that he is seeing a barn. The problem: This is a clear counter-example to the traditional definition of knowledge. In this case, S possesses a belief p and has a strong justification (i.e. strong evidence, strong reasons) for believing p, and p is true, but S does not know p. Knowledge cannot be defined as ‘justified true belief’ since this is a case where S has a justified true belief that p, but S doesn’t know p. |
The Problem Resolved: A New Definition of Knowledge-- | |||||
‘S knows p’ if and only if:
Condition 3 assumes that the acquisition of knowledge is a natural process, and that a 'belief' is a functional mental state involving an attitude of affirming, doubting, denying, or suspending judgment about a propositional assertion. Condition 3 requires that S's true belief must be the result of evidence that is relevant for why p should be believed true. In other words, the implicit or explicit reasons for S's belief that p must be the grounds (i.e., a truth-connection) for why p should be believed true. Whether condition 3 is satisfied is either true or false, and is conceived to be an externalist condition. Condition 4 is a conjunction of internalist and externalist conditions. Condition 4a is normative and prescriptive, and its content is identical to the 'justification condition' in the traditional definition of knowledge. Condition 4b is a 'no defeaters' condition. If there exists unconsidered counter-evidence q such that this undermining counter-evidence would lead S to doubt p, then S does not know p. The above definition eliminates the term 'justification' and correctly explains why Professor S does not know that ‘B is in room 222' and why Henry does not know that ‘I see a barn.’ In the first case, Professor S does not know p because conditions 3 and 4b are violated. In the second case, Henry does not know p because condition 4b is violated. In chapter one of Descriptions, Prescriptions and the Limits of Knowledge , I argue that this definition provides a basis for judging in any material situation whether (or not) it is true that ‘S knows p.’ While these four conditions are intended to be the necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge, because 4a is normative, they are not precise enough to judge every instance of potential knowing as an unequivocal instance of knowledge. But with the examination of numerous example cases, it is shown that these four conditions are the core basis for judging whether S knows p.
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