Home Page: What is Knowledge?

Preface (10 pages).

Introduction to Eight Essays in Conceptual Analysis (4 pages).

This set of essays is a companion to the two volumes of Descriptions Prescriptions, and the Limits of Knowledge. The essays are valuable for synthesizing relationships among the chapters in the lead volumes.

Essay 1: A Predominately Externalist Definition of Knowledge Submitted to Episteme. (36 pages).

ABSTRACT: Most philosophers believe that a necessary and sufficient conditions analysis of knowledge cannot be fruitful. Against this worldview, I propose a four-condition predominately externalist (PE) definition of knowledge. In addition to the traditional ‘justified true belief’ conditions, a 'relevancy condition' and a 'no-defeaters condition' are added. We will examine eight case studies and explain why S knows or doesn't know in various situations, including the parked car case, barn façade case, and two lottery cases. We'll respond to the skeptical argument and the 'safety' condition. A key feature of the PE theory is that it doesn't guarantee that knowledge exists. The skeptical hypothesis is accepted, and epistemic closure is rejected, so that the PE definition doesn't assure that S knows any p. The definition just states the necessary and sufficient conditions for the possibility of knowledge. Against the skeptic's impossibility conclusion, with the satisfaction of the PE conditions, knowledge is clearly possible and obtainable.

Artificial Intelligence (AI) Review: "A Predominately Externalist Definition of Knowledge" (July 1, 2025, courtesy of Academia.edu).

REVIEW (AI): Overall, "A Predominately Externalist Definition of Knowledge" represents a compelling and rigorous contribution to epistemology, with potential implications that extend beyond traditional bounds. The intellectual contribution is substantial, offering a pathway through which epistemologists might fruitfully explore the necessity and sufficiency of knowledge conditions that admit skeptical possibilities while maintaining an optimistic view of knowledge attainability... The insightful handling of classical epistemological issues within a modern framework is to be commended.

Essay 2: The Methodology of Analytic Philosophy: Intuitions, Concepts, and Conceptual Analysis Submitted to Metaphilosophy. (32 pages).

ABSTRACT: In this essay I defend intuitions, and conceptual analysis as being crucial to a social scientific analytic linguistic philosophy. This essay recognizes a distinction between world-view intuitions and linguistic intuitions as beliefs that motivate conceptual analyses. I argue that since a theory cannot be constructed solely out of unbiased and neutral world-view intuitions, the analytic philosopher must provide a theory with hypotheses and examples that provide reasons to believe that a given worldview is true. An analytic theory mediates between 'world-view intuitions' (e.g. about theism, naturalism, possible-worlds realism) and 'linguistic intuitions' (i.e. involving the use of particular concepts and sentences). Six key kinds of concepts are hypothesized: (1) Natural Kind, (2) Group Resemblance, (3) Fixed Definiens, (4) Fictional Entity, (5) Definite Description, and (6) Proper Names. The intuitions of Williamson (2007), Cappelen (2012), and Deutsch (2015) about methodology are critiqued.

Essay 3: A Theory of Metaethical Prescriptivism Submitted to Analytic Philosophy. (35 pages).

ABSTRACT: The ‘prescriptivist’ metaethical theory argued here makes the claim that moral assertions are neither true nor false; and thus, they are not knowable. The name 'prescriptivism' is not associated with Hare's (1952, 1963) theory. This theory hypothesizes that ethical assertions and value affirmations are ‘prescriptions.’ ‘Descriptions’ are assertions that are literally true or false, and ‘prescriptions’ are assertions intended to be agreed-upon (but not literally true or false). The 'correctness' of any ethical assertion (or value affirmation) is dependent upon what persons accept, tolerate, or agree-to, and does not refer to an objective moral reality.

Essay 4: A Tripartite Theory of 'Definition.' Submitted to Acta Analytica (33 pages). (A 39 page version with response to critic, pp. 31-37).

ABSTRACT: This essay analyzes the nature of 'definition' as a definiendum-to-definiens relationship. A 'tripartite theory' of definition is hypothesized. It states that whenever a person defines a definiendum- to-a-definiens, that person can only be interpreted as asserting either a 'reportive definition,' a 'theoretic definition,' or a 'stipulative definition.' In order to verify the truth of the theory, a conceptual investigation about the functional use of definitions in various situations is described by examples. Of special interest are the examples of 'stipulative definition.' As a mathematical anti-realist, I contend that formal systems are largely composed of stipulative definitions that are either 'technically formalized' or 'abbreviatory' in nature. To back up the tripartite theory, I discuss Carnap’s concept of ‘explication,’ and sketch a ‘game formalism’ account of mathematics. A theory of definition and an epistemology of mathematics is presented.

Essay 5: Ambiguities in Speaker Reference Submitted to The Philosophical Review. (40 pages).

ABSTRACT: In the philosophy of language there is a well-known distinction between 'semantic reference' which is a relation between a linguistic expression and an entity, and 'speaker reference' which is a relation between a speaker and an entity. While most studies pursue semantic reference, I will present a theory of 'speaker reference.' I argue that the results of case studies from Saul Kripke (1980), Keith Donnellan (1966), and Richard K. Heck (2018), are all explainable with a speaker theory. Further, I argue that 'semantic reference' doesn't really exist unless it is stipulated by a formal model. Consequentially, laypersons cannot have linguistic intuitions about semantic reference. In contrast, almost everyone has linguistic intuitions about speaker reference, as is discussed. It is concluded that ‘linguistic reference’ is found in artificial languages, but not in natural language, and that any ambiguities in reference are those of speaker reference.

ABSTRACT: Propositions are thought to differ from sentences in the following ways: (1) Propositions are declarative sentences that in context present the 'content' of S's thought. (2) A proposition is metaphorically 'what is said' by a declarative sentence. (3) Different sentences in context can mean 'the same thing' or have 'the same meaning'; i.e., different sentences can express the same proposition (relative to context). (4) Propositions (as descriptive assertions) are true or false in context. These four intuitions seem satisfactory. In addition to these, it is also thought that: (5) A proposition is essentially true or false and (6) Persons have ‘attitudes’ towards propositions. I argue that the last two intuitions are false. I argue that (1) speakers can assert propositions that are ‘truth-apt’ or ‘non-truth-apt’ and (2) persons don't have an 'attitude' relationship to propositions. This essay will explore our linguistic intuitions (and stipulate a definition) for the term 'proposition.'

ABSTRACT: Experimental philosophers have criticized ‘the method of cases’ on grounds that the verdicts of various case studies when presented to laypersons, have led to diverse answers. These verdicts are sometimes based upon irrelevant factors such as cultural background, order of case presentation, affective content, and heritable personality traits. The ‘expertise’ of philosophers’ intuitions is questioned. In this essay I defend expert intuitions and the method of cases as crucial to answering questions related to aesthetics. I introduce a ‘hybrid’ definition of ‘art’ and suggest eight case studies (with questions) to experimental philosophers; and invite them to survey willing participants. At a future time, we can compare participant answers with theory answers. While I’m interested in any statistical results, I maintain that any divergence from the ‘correct’ answers that I propose isn’t evidence of a failure of the hybrid definition or of the method of cases. Instead, with any divergence in opinion, it is the task of the theorist to explain to survey participants why an alternative answer is preferable. To reiterate, this essay defends the methodology of conceptual analysis, and introduces a tentative definition of ‘art.’

ABSTRACT: A short history of 'definition' in recent philosophy is presented. The views presented here are in approximate chronological historical order and revolve around discussion of 'real' and 'nominal' definitions. Under the tripartite theory, a 'real' definition is approximately identified as a 'theoretic' definition. A 'nominal' definition is understood to be identified as 'reportive' or 'stipulative.' The conclusion of this history is that the quoted texts support the idea that mathematical definitions are typically (3b) stipulative abbreviations or (3c) stipulative formalizations of fixed definiens concepts.

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