Home Page: What is Knowledge?

Back Cover (1 page)

Preface (4 pages)

Introduction (10 pages)

Chapter 1- A Predominately Externalist Definition of Knowledge (41 pages)

ABSTRACT: I propose a four-condition predominately externalist (PE) definition of knowledge. In addition to the traditional conditions (i.e. truth, belief, and personal justification) a 'relevancy condition' and a 'no-defeaters condition' are included. I challenge the intuitions that led to the rejection of the 'no-defeaters' condition by showing that there are two senses of 'relevance' and two senses of 'justification' that need to be made explicit. The definition is motivated with classic hypothetical examples from Alvin Goldman, Gilbert Harman, Keith Lehrer, David Annis, Laurence Bonjour, John Hawthorne, and others. Empirical propositions and the conditions for how they can be known are described and are compared to 'lottery propositions' which are unknowable.

Chapter 2- A Response to Radical Skepticism (21 pages)

ABSTRACT: The radical skeptic provides a two premise argument that is supposed to show that knowledge is impossible. In this chapter, the argument is scrutinized and one of the skeptic's premises is rejected: the principle of 'epistemic closure.' It is argued that epistemic closure (i.e., modus ponens across knowledge states) is not always true, so it cannot serve as the basis for the skeptic's conclusion that knowledge of ordinary propositions is impossible.

Chapter 3- A Contextualist Theory of Personal Justification (14 pages)

ABSTRACT: The question of whether a person has 'adequate' or 'strong enough' evidence to believe and ultimately know an empirical proposition is a problem for the traditional definition of knowledge, and it remains a question for the predominately externalist definition of knowledge. How much evidence (e.g. quantity and quality) must one possess before one can claim to know p is true? When is evidence 'sufficient' to rule-out the existence of defeating facts (and to eliminate doubt, and retain a strong belief that p is true)? What stops a skeptical regress in the demand for reasons to support a belief and the beliefs that support it? I advocate a contextualist theory of personally justified belief similar to the ideas proposed by David Annis (1978), Robert Hambourger (1987), Michael Williams (2001), and Adam Leite (2005). A contextualist theory better explains 'personal justification' than foundationalism or coherence theories.

Chapter 4- A Response to Hume's Problem of Induction (12 pages)

ABSTRACT: David Hume (1748) states that in order to be justified in believing that induction is a reliable method of inference, one must possess either a deductive argument or a non-circular inductive argument in support of induction. Hume argues that there are no such arguments available, and that our belief that induction is reliable is unjustified. In this chapter, I concur with Hume that there is no justified belief (or argument) that supports induction as a reliable methodological norm. This is because condition 3 in the PE definition of knowledge cannot be satisfied. We cannot have relevant reasons (due to circular reasoning) to possess a 'justified belief' that the future will resemble the past. However, particular inductive conclusions are contingently knowable, and as Hume admitted, we are 'personally justified' in using induction. This chapter explores the relations between the concepts of justified belief, personal justification, inductive argument, deductive argument, and knowledge.

Chapter 5- A Theory of Metaethical Prescriptivism (23 pages)

ABSTRACT: In the philosophical literature and in standard dictionaries, there is a general distinction between descriptions and prescriptions. In this chapter, I attempt to precisely define these concepts. In short, I argue that 'descriptions' are assertions that are literally true or false (and possibly knowable) and that 'prescriptions' are not literally true or false (and are not knowable). I maintain that all normative ethical assertions are prescriptions. Practical ethical arguments typically contain both descriptive and prescriptive premises, and all normative conclusions are prescriptions. This theory is offered as an alternative to the anti-realist metaethical theories of Ayer (1946), Stevenson (1944), Harman (1977), Hare (1981), Gibbard (1990), Blackburn (1993), and Timmons (1999).

Chapter 6- A Theory of Definition & Concepts (44 pages)

ABSTRACT: This chapter has four parts. (I.) It is hypothesized that whenever a person asserts how a linguistic entity (i.e. word, phrase, symbol, definiendum) has been used, is used, or is going to be used; a person can only be interpreted as asserting a reportive definition, theoretic definition, or a stipulative definition. If this linguistic theory is true, we should be able to understand any definition of a definiendum-to-definiens form (in a context) as being one of these three types. This 'tripartite definition' of 'definition' is either true or false. (II.) Six kinds of concepts are described as part of a descriptive metaphysics: (1) natural kind concepts (2) group resemblance concepts, (3) fixed definiens concepts (4) fictional entity concepts (5) definite description concepts, and (6) proper name concepts. As a measurement system, these concepts formulate a (non-neutral) metaphysical system. (III.) The relationship between three kinds of concepts (viz. natural kind, group resemblance, and fixed definiens) and the kinds of definitions that they are typically associated with is explored. These relationships help explain the normal uses of reportive, theoretic, and stipulative definitions in the physical, mathematical, and social sciences. (IV.) The 'tripartite theory of definition' in section I (above) is confirmed. With the methodology of conceptual analysis, other familiar kinds of definition are examined (e.g., analytic, ostensive, real, nominal, etc.). These other kinds of definitions are shown to be identical to, fall under, be explainable, or refutable under these three primary types.

Chapter 7- How Can We Know Mathematical Truths? (33 pages)

ABSTRACT: The goal of this chapter is to present a summary sketch of an 'antirealist' account of mathematics as contrasted to opposing 'realist' positions. This chapter suggests that: 1) the inference rules that make up any formal system are prescriptive, 2) the implicit and explicit axioms underlying formal systems are prescriptive, 3) the definitions found in the deductive sciences are stipulative and are thus prescriptive, 4) the 'truths' deduced in formal deductive systems can be understood as 'true-in-a-language,' and 5) a 'game formalist' account complements the predominately externalist (PE) definition of knowledge. A formalist explains how one can know that '141678 + 639465 = 781143'. The method of conceptual analysis will be used to examine the concepts and structure of artificial deductive systems.

Chapter 8- How Can Aesthetic Judgments Be True or False? (29 pages)

ABSTRACT: In this chapter we are concerned with the epistemology of aesthetic assertion. I argue in support of a simple subjectivism: aesthetic assertions are reducible to true or false reports of a relationship between a perceiver S and an aesthetic item x. Aesthetic judgments are true or false in the sense that they are descriptions of personal (and subjective) likes/dislikes, but there is no independent natural order that makes one person's aesthetic interests and preferences better than others. For example, when S asserts that 'the painting is beautiful,' that 'The Horse Whisperer is a good movie,' or that 'Taylor Swift is the best contemporary female vocalist,' S is ultimately describing a favorable (or unfavorable) relation between S's own tastes (or values, preferences) as an existing mental state to item x. We normally grant that persons can describe what aesthetic items and experiences (truly) please them. Because persons have shared interests, values, and tastes, a viewer may believe that a certain audience will like/dislike an item x, and prescribe whether they should experience x. For example, S can judge whether a novel is intriguing, or a kind of ice cream tastes good, and make appropriate recommendations. Expert critics of an aesthetic medium (e.g., film, food, novels) tend to have more experience with that medium, and acquire a refined (or more discriminatory) taste, and make more informed judgments.

Chapter 9- The Methodology of Analytic Philosophy: Intuitions, Concepts, and Conceptual Analysis (27 pages)

ABSTRACT: The question of 'what is proper philosophical methodology?' has become the subject of lively debate over the past two decades. While there is a long-running historical debate about methodology between rationalists and empiricists, there has recently been a more focused debate about the relevance of philosophical intuitions and the methodology of conceptual analysis. In this chapter, I defend the use of intuitions, conceptual analysis, and thought-experiments as being crucial to a scientific analytic linguistic philosophy.

Chapter 10- Descriptions, Prescriptions, and the Limits of Knowledge (14 pages)

ABSTRACT: Prescriptions include: (1) stipulative definitions, (2) the axioms, vocabulary definitions, syntax, and inference rules of formal deductive systems, (3) 'sufficient evidence' assertions, and (4) ethical assertions. These propositions cannot replace p in 'S knows p.' In contrast, descriptions include (1) empirical statements, (2) true-in-a-language sentences, and applied mathematical-deductive entailments, (3) reportive definitions, (4) theoretic definitions, (5) aesthetic assertions and (6) social science theories, that are potentially true and knowable. J.L. Austin's (1975) notion of a 'performative' utterance and the declarative-interrogative-imperative' distinctions are discussed. Twenty-eight questions are posed about the topics of knowledge and evidence; moral, mathematical, and aesthetic concepts; philosophical methodology; speaker reference and propositions; and the concepts of necessity and existence.

References (19 pages)

Appendix (1 page)

Back to What is Knowledge?